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In a pandemic setting, surveillance is essential to mon-
itor the spread of the disease and assess its impact. 
Appropriate mitigation and healthcare preparedness 
strategies depend on fast and accurate epidemic sur-
veillance data. During the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pan-
demic, rapid improvements in influenza surveillance 
were made in Iceland. Here, we describe the improve-
ments made in influenza surveillance during the pan-
demic , which could also be of great value in outbreaks 
caused by other pathogens. Following the raised level 
of pandemic influenza alert in April 2009, influenza 
surveillance was intensified. A comprehensive auto-
matic surveillance system for influenza-like illness 
was developed, surveillance of influenza-related 
deaths was established and laboratory surveillance 
for influenza was strengthened. School absenteeism 
reports were also collected and compared with results 
from the automatic surveillance system. The first case 
of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) was diagnosed 
in Iceland in May 2009, but sustained community 
transmission was not confirmed until mid-August. 
The pandemic virus circulated during the summer and 
early autumn before an abrupt increase in the number 
of cases was observed in October. There were large 
outbreaks in elementary schools for children aged 
6–15 years throughout the country that peaked in late 
October. School absenteeism reports from all elemen-
tary schools in Iceland gave a similar epidemiological 
curve as that from data from the healthcare system. 
Estimates of the proportion of the population infected 
with the pandemic virus ranged from 10% to 22%. This 
study shows how the sudden need for improved sur-
veillance in the pandemic led to rapid improvements 
in data collection in Iceland. This reporting system will 
be improved upon and expanded to include other noti-
fiable diseases, to ensure accurate and timely collec-
tion of epidemiological data.
Introduction
The first reports of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 
in humans in the United States and Mexico appeared 
in April 2009 [1]. Initial descriptions of the outbreak in 
Mexico were alarming, with severe cases of pneumonia 
and high mortality in previously healthy young adults 
being reported [1]. On 27 April 2009, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) raised the level of pandemic influ-
enza alert from phase three to four and two days later 
from phase four to five [2,3]. Countries were encour-
aged to activate their pandemic preparedness plans 
and remain on high alert for unusual outbreaks of influ-
enza-like illness and severe pneumonia. In a pandemic, 
both clinical and epidemiological data are essential 
in attempts to assess the severity of the illness. The 
allocation of healthcare resources and choice of appro-
priate intervention strategies also rely on accurate 
and timely surveillance data. Such data are essen-
tial in identifying groups at risk of severe illness and 
who should be prioritised in vaccination strategies. 
Surveillance is also needed to evaluate the impact of 
different interventions. Heightened surveillance was 
therefore a high priority during the pandemic in order 
to detect the first cases and monitor the spread of the 
disease. 
Conventional surveillance methods for influenza are 
mostly based on laboratory surveillance and sentinel 
surveillance of influenza-like illness (ILI), but interest 
in mortality surveillance has increased during the last 
decade [4,5]. Unconventional surveillance methods, 
such as school absenteeism, syndromic surveillance 
and mobile phone surveillance, have also been used 
but these methods require further validation [6-8]. All 
elementary schools for children aged 6–15 years in 
Iceland enter information on school absenteeism into a 
common database, but these data have not been ana-
lysed for epidemiological purposes so far [9].
There were differences in healthcare services, surveil-
lance and interventions between European countries 
during the 2009 pandemic. Reports from individual 
countries on the pandemic are therefore crucial to com-
pare experiences, share knowledge and maximise the 
lessons learned after the pandemic. In this article we 
report the changes made in the surveillance of influ-
enza in Iceland and describe the data collected during 
the pandemic.
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Surveillance systems in Iceland 
Surveillance of influenza-like illness
In April 2009 surveillance of ILI in Iceland was based 
on monthly paper-based reporting of aggregated data 
from primary healthcare centres to the Centre for 
Health Security and Communicable Disease Control 
(CHS-CDC). After WHO initially raised the pandemic 
alert level, Icelandic legislation was changed allowing 
personal, identifiable information to be collected for 
each case. Simultaneously, an online automatic system 
for immediate reporting of ILI and cases with labora-
tory-confirmed influenza to the CHS-CDC was devel-
oped, using the same software used for electronic 
patient records in primary health care and hospitals in 
Iceland [10].
The current International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10) for standard diagnostic classification and 
International Classification of Primary Care (ICPC-2) 
for standard classification of a patient’s reason for 
encounter were used to identify ILI and confirmed 
influenza cases for automatic online reporting in the 
system [11,12]. The following ICD-10 codes were used: 
J10, J10.0 J10.1, J10.8, J11, J11.0, J11.1, J11.8 and U05.9; 
the ICPC-2 code used was R80. Whenever physicians 
suspected ILI or diagnosed confirmed influenza they 
were asked to use the appropriate ICD-10 code in their 
reporting. After the physician confirmed his record for 
the patient visit in the electronic patient journal cases 
with ICD-10 codes for ILI and confirmed influenza were 
automatically selected and automatically reported 
within 24 hours via a closed electronic network to 
the CHC-CDC comprising all healthcare centres and 
hospitals in Iceland. The data collected for each case 
included: name, personal identification number, date of 
birth, place of residence, date of visit to the healthcare 
centre or hospital, patient’s age, sex, which healthcare 
service the case attended, medical licence number and 
name of attending physician, the ICD-10 code and the 
ICPC code. Patients registered with ICD-10 codes for the 
most common acute respiratory infections (ARI) were 
also reported automatically and online in the same way 
as the influenza and ILI cases. Unlike sentinel systems, 
the automatic reporting system allowed data to be col-
lected from each and every primary healthcare centre 
and hospital emergency room, thus capturing the vast 
majority of all diagnosed cases.
The European case definitions for ILI, confirmed 
cases of seasonal influenza and confirmed cases of 
Figure 1
Weekly number of reported cases of influenza-like illness by sex, Iceland, 1 July to 31 December 2009 (n=9,887)
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2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) were used and the 
selected ICD-10 and ICPC-2 codes were recorded by the 
physicians [13-14]. In mid-June, when the system was 
in place, it was also possible to gather data retrospec-
tively from 1 April 2009. 
Laboratory surveillance
The Department of Virology at the Landspitali 
University Hospital in Reykjavik is the sole diagnostic 
laboratory for influenza in the country. The laboratory 
received respiratory samples from the nasopharynx 
and/or throat that were collected from patients with 
ILI by physicians in primary healthcare centres and at 
hospitals.
Influenza was diagnosed by real-time polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) according to a recommended pro-
tocol from the United States Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) [15]. Clinical information and the 
country of infection were collected on confirmed cases 
both at the laboratory and at the CHS-CDC. The weekly 
number of tested respiratory samples and personal 
information on confirmed cases was reported to the 
CHS-CDC.
Surveillance of school absenteeism
All elementary schools in Iceland routinely enter infor-
mation on school absenteeism for schoolchildren 
aged 6–15 years into a central database maintained 
by the information technology company Mentor ehf 
in Reykjavik [9]. School absence was recorded as the 
number of days absent; comparable data were avail-
able for 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Mortality surveillance
Mortality data are collected by the National Registry 
and sent to the CHS-CDC routinely on a weekly basis. 
The data included the name, personal identification 
number, date of birth, place of residence and date 
Figure 3
Proportional number of reported influenza-like illness cases by age group, Iceland, July to December 2009
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Figure 2
Age-specific incidence of reported influenza-like illness 
cases by sex, Iceland, 1 July to 31 December 2009
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of death for each individual. A temporary system for 
surveillance of patients with ILI and confirmed pan-
demic influenza admitted to hospital was developed 
within all hospitals and these cases and deaths in 
this group were reported immediately to the CHS-CDC. 
Unexpected deaths in the community in patients with 
ILI or confirmed pandemic influenza were also to be 
reported by the physicians to the CHS-CDC.
Data analysis 
Estimated number of infections 
in the community
The percentage of positive laboratory samples was 
used as an estimate of the proportion of ILI cases in 
the community with pandemic influenza. To estimate 
the total number of infected individuals in the com-
munity, we therefore multiplied the weekly number of 
reported ILI cases by the weekly percentage of labo-
ratory samples confirmed positive for pandemic influ-
enza and summed over the course of the pandemic. 
The denominators used in this study were mid-2009 
demographic data from the Icelandic Population 
Registry, according to age, sex and place of residence, 
as appropriate.
Surveillance data 
Influenza-like illness
Throughout May and June 2009, few cases of ILI and 
confirmed pandemic influenza were reported. An 
increase in the number of laboratory-confirmed cases 
of pandemic influenza was observed from mid-July, 
when there was a simultaneous absence of confirmed 
seasonal influenza. Cases of ILI reported from 1 July 
2009 onwards were therefore considered to represent 
the illness caused by pandemic influenza.
From 1 July to 31 December 2009 a total of 9,887 cases 
of ILI were reported, of whom 5,372 (54%) were female 
and 4,515 (46%) were male. The number of cases 
increased slowly from mid-July to the end of August 
and fell slightly in mid-September (Figure 1). A sharp 
increase was observed in October: the number of cases 
peaked later that month, followed by a rapid decrease. 
Only sporadic ILI cases were reported in late December.
The incidence of ILI was highest in children and young 
adults and decreased with age, as shown in Figure 2. 
ILI incidence was similar in both sexes in people aged 
under 18 years. However, in people over 60 years, the 
incidence was higher in women (p=0.003), but the 
largest difference by sex was observed in people aged 
18–59 years, with incidence again higher in females 
(p<0.001) (Figure 2). 
Figure 3 shows how the age of the reported ILI cases 
changed with time. In July to September 2009, most 
cases were reported in the 15–30 years age group, but 
a sudden change was observed in October, when the 
majority of cases were aged from 0 to 15 years (Figure 
3).
Reported ILI cases were categorised by the postcode 
of their place of residence. The cumulative number of 
reported cases over time is given for the four most 
populated postal districts in the south-west, north 
and south of the country (Figure 4). There was some 
indication of spatial dispersal in late September 2009; 
the number of reported cases increased earlier in the 
south-west postal districts 1 and 2, followed by an 
abrupt increase in mid-October in all districts at the 
same time. The overall number of cases peaked shortly 
after mid-October (Figure 1, Table).
Data from the surveillance of ARI from the same auto-
matic online system showed similar trends over time as 
Figure 4
Cumulative number of reported ILI cases as a proportion 
of the total number of ILI cases by postal district, Iceland, 
1 July to 31 December 2009
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ILI: influenza-like illness.
Table
Reported cases of influenza-like illness by region, Iceland, 
July to December 2009 (n=9,887)
Region Postal district Number of re-ported ILI cases Median time
a 
Capital area
1 3,643 19 Oct
2 3,019 19 Oct
West Iceland 3 404 22 Oct
West fjords 4 109 21 Oct
North West 5 340 27 Oct
North East 6 1,016 24 Oct
East Iceland 7 466 22 Oct
South Iceland 8 598 21 Oct
Westman Islands 9 80 27 Oct
Unknown Missing 212 – 
Total 1–9 9,887 20 Oct
ILI: influenza-like illness.
a The date (in 2009) when half of the ILI cases were reported in the 
postal district.
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the ILI cases, with a peak in early to mid-October 2009 
(week 41) (unpublished data).
Laboratory-confirmed cases 
of pandemic influenza
From May to mid-August 2009, physicians were encour-
aged by the chief epidemiologist to take samples from 
patients with ILI. The first case of pandemic influenza 
in the country was laboratory confirmed on 19 May 
2009. Three confirmed cases were identified in June, 
but in late July and August (week 30 to 33) an increase 
in the number of cases was observed. The first cases 
in May and June acquired the infection abroad or their 
infection was domestically acquired with known con-
nection to another confirmed case. The proportion of 
domestic cases with no known connection to other 
confirmed cases increased rapidly in July and August. 
In mid-August (week 33), sustained transmission of 
infection was confirmed in Iceland and decreased sam-
pling was recommended by the Chief Epidemiologist. 
From that point on, diagnosis of influenza was based 
on the physician’s clinical examination, and samples 
were to be obtained only from patients with severe ill-
ness or increased risk of serious illness.
Figure 6
School absenteeism in elementary schools counted in number of days missed, Iceland, weeks 33–52 in 2007–2009
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Figure 5
Number of respiratory samples and proportion positive for 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1), Iceland, 29 June to 27 
December 2009
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Following this recommendation, there was a decrease 
in late August 2009 (week 34 and 35) in the number 
of respiratory samples collected, with a concomitant 
decrease in the number of laboratory-confirmed cases 
(Figure 5). From the end of June to the end of December 
(weeks 27–53), 3,011 samples were collected, of which 
702 (23%) tested positive for the pandemic virus. The 
number of samples and the percentage of samples 
positive increased in late September (week 40) and 
peaked in mid-October (week 42), when 293 samples 
were collected, 56% of which tested positive. These 
patterns were consistent with the changes observed in 
the number of reported ILI cases.
Pandemic influenza was laboratory confirmed in peo-
ple living in all regions of the country. The age distri-
bution of cases with laboratory-confirmed infections 
was the same as that observed for reported ILI cases 
(unpublished data).
School absenteeism
In September 2009 (week 40), shortly after the school 
year started, an increase in school absenteeism was 
observed, compared with the levels at that time in the 
previous two years (Figure 6). A sharp increase was 
observed in October 2009, compared with the same 
period in the previous two years, with a high peak in 
mid-October (week 42) (Figure 6). In late October and 
November (week 43 to 46), there was a rapid fall in 
school absenteeism and from mid-November to the 
end of December it was similar to that seen in the two 
previous years.
Mortality levels
No increase in overall mortality was observed from 
September to December 2009, according to data from 
the National Registry. Two persons with laboratory-
confirmed pandemic influenza died during this time: 
an 18-year-old woman and an 81-year-old man who 
both had underlying conditions.
Estimated number of pandemic influenza 
infections in the community
A total of 3,336 cases were expected to be positive if 
all ILI cases were tested. This is a lower bound esti-
mate since, in the latter part of the epidemic; tests 
were performed primarily on severe cases that could 
be caused by complications, rather than influenza. 
According to previous studies, approximately 10% of 
symptomatic influenza cases occur in the community 
for each ILI case detected by the surveillance system 
[16,17]. The expected number of symptomatic cases 
would therefore be 33,368 or 10.4% of the total popu-
lation (n=319.246). A large number of asymptomatic 
infections are also expected to have occurred. A more 
detailed model has been used to estimate the number 
of 2009 pandemic influenza infections in the United 
Kingdom more closely [18], but such modelling is 
beyond the scope of our study.
Discussion
This article summarises the surveillance and epide-
miology of the pandemic influenza in Iceland in 2009, 
showing how rapid improvements in influenza surveil-
lance were feasible by connecting the existing struc-
ture in the healthcare system for patient records to 
electronic surveillance system for reporting ILI cases. 
This system does not require any additional input from 
physicians, enabling comprehensive data from the 
entire country to be collected with near real-time infor-
mation on the geographical spread, age and sex of ILI 
cases. 
The initial increase in the number of ILI cases was first 
observed in the western regions of the country, with 
eastern regions following approximately one week 
later; the peak of ILI activity showed a similar delay 
(Figure 2 and Table). A west-to-east spread has been 
described in four of eight influenza seasons from 1999 
to 2007 in Europe [19]. The most likely explanation for 
the direction of spread of the epidemic in Iceland is that 
the densely populated area of the capital Reykjavik in 
the south-west corner of Iceland provides ample oppor-
tunities for the spread of the pandemic virus; most for-
eign travel, whether for business or leisure, begins or 
ends in Reykjavik.
The difference in the number of reported ILI cases by 
sex in our data could be due to females being more 
prone to the disease than men, but this hypothesis is 
not supported by previous studies, with the exception 
of increased risk of severe illness in pregnant women 
[20]. An alternative explanation could be that females 
contact physicians more often than males. The initia-
tive to contact the physician for children and older peo-
ple who are ill often comes from parents or other close 
relatives without regard the patient’s sex, which could 
explain equal ILI reporting rate by sex for children and 
minor sex differences in the rates of reporting of older 
people. Adults from 18 to 60 years, however, decide 
themselves when to contact the physician and the dif-
ferences between males and females observed in that 
age group in our data probably reflect more frequent 
visits to the physicians by females in general. Analysis 
of all encounters by age and sex in primary healthcare 
centres in Iceland during 2005, which shows a pattern 
similar to that observed in our data, gives support to 
this explanation [21]. 
People aged 15–30 years were probably at increased 
risk of acquiring the pandemic virus during July to 
September 2009 due to risky behaviour with frequent 
travel abroad and spending weekends at crowded out-
door festivals in Iceland. The age distribution in Iceland 
is in accordance with a recently published serological 
study from England that showed pre-existing antibod-
ies in older age groups that protected against infection 
[22].
There are uncertainties in our estimate of the true 
number of pandemic influenza cases in the community. 
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The number of samples sent for virological analysis 
varied over time and it is possible that some samples 
were false negative. The exact proportion of patients 
with ILI in community who contacted healthcare was 
unknown and may have varied between regions and by 
sex and age group. Multiplying each reported ILI case 
by 10 should give a rough estimate of the number of 
cases in the community. Although the care-seeking 
behaviour for influenza in Iceland has not been stud-
ied, an estimate of 1 in 10 seeking care is supported 
by a recent serological study [22]. It may be possible to 
estimate the proportion of infected individuals seeking 
healthcare more accurately using a detailed disease 
transmission model, but such analysis is beyond the 
scope of this paper and we leave this for future study. 
A small study, based on a questionnaire, carried out 
in the Akureyri municipality in northern Iceland in 
mid-November 2009 on the true incidence of ILI in 
the community showed a 22% cumulative attack rate 
(unpublished data), supporting the outcome of the sim-
ple model described in this study with regard to age, 
sex and timing of the epidemic curve by onset of ill-
ness. We therefore estimated that the percentage of 
symptomatic people infected in the community ranged 
from 10% to 22%. Estimates from other countries for 
the 2009 pandemic also concluded that the percentage 
of people infected with the pandemic virus was less 
than 30% of the population [18,22].
There are limitations to our ILI surveillance system. It 
was developed just in time for the pandemic, had not 
been adequately tested and baseline data for ILI had 
not been established. It is possible that physicians 
were affected by the introduction of a new report-
ing system and the ongoing pandemic in their clinical 
assessment. However, the ARI surveillance data do not 
support this hypothesis. They showed that physicians 
used ICD-10 codes for ARI when influenza was not sus-
pected. The number of ARI cases peaked in week 41, 
which probably reflects the increase in illness caused 
by respiratory viruses other than influenza and/or the 
pandemic virus in cases with mild symptoms. In our 
study, ARI was used for quality assurance but further 
development is intended to enable timely and accurate 
ARI surveillance.
Our analysis of the data from elementary schools 
accounts for school absenteeism in number of days 
absent. The analysis of school absenteeism needs to 
be developed further with age-specific data on the 
number of children absent in each school. It is a novel 
method to estimate the number of children with ILI 
in the community for every ILI case registered in the 
healthcare system. It also enables assessment of the 
socio-economic impact of parents caring for sick chil-
dren at home and ultimately enables real-time monitor-
ing of local or widespread outbreaks in schools.
The pandemic virus circulated in the community in 
Iceland during summer and autumn. Elementary 
schools started in late August, with moderate spread of 
ILI in schoolchildren during September. But it remains 
unclear why a large outbreak occurred in October in 
children attending these schools, rather than in early 
September, immediately after the schools started. 
Our study shows how the sudden need for improved 
surveillance during the pandemic led to rapid improve-
ments in data collection. However, it is, of course, 
preferable to have a system in place when pandemics 
hit. Retrospective data were not collected during the 
pandemic for two main reasons: firstly, the amount of 
data would have overloaded both the database and 
the electronic reporting system and secondly, there 
was no time to check the validity of the older data and 
compare with the real-time data during the pandemic. 
Retrospective data will be collected and a baseline for 
ILI will be established in future work. 
Using the same software for patient records and for 
surveillance provides a unique opportunity for real-
time surveillance and risk assessment. No human 
input is needed to report the cases, which secures the 
sustainability of the system and improves the data 
delivery, compared with the old paper-based reporting 
system, with regard to the completeness and the time-
liness of the data. The data are delivered when the phy-
sician has confirmed his record for the patient visit in 
the electronic patient journal, which can be a problem 
if physicians postpone their confirmation for weeks, 
months or even longer. The physicians were, however, 
constantly reminded during the pandemic to confirm 
the patient record, but this may need improvements. 
The surveillance system established during the pan-
demic has replaced the older paper-based reporting 
system for ILI and will be expanded and improved to 
replace the current system of surveillance of all other 
notifiable diseases, thus eliminating all paper-based 
reporting, Changes to the system can be done rapidly, 
enabling real time surveillance of new and emerging 
diseases and syndromes that may appear in hospitals 
and primary healthcare centres in Iceland.
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